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THE RECENT CONTENTIONS that a government scientistwas responsible for the 2001 anthrax letter attacks rep-
resent a challenge to this country’s resolve to remain a
global leader. Our future is inextricably bound with our
ability to maintain a pre-eminent role in science, and so it is
imperative that our leadership and citizenry have the confi-
dence in American science that it well warrants. Nothing in
the latest events should change that reality.
Biodefense research clearly is necessary for the protection
of the United States, but such research is far more than that
focused on bioweapons and bioterrorism. Rather, biode-
fense is one aspect of a much larger scientific research and
commercial enterprise integral to continuing advances in
public health and safety, agriculture, and energy as well as
national security. It is an axiom of scientific progress that
research in one area produces utility in unrelated areas. For
example, fungal research gave us antibiotics and choles-
terol-lowering drugs, and bacterial research gave us anti-
cancer drugs. Research into anthrax, one of a myriad of
pathogens ubiquitous in nature—Mother Nature being the
original “bioterrorist”—has led to a far greater understand-
ing of the human immune system and of emerging as well
as historic infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, which
again is on the rise in this country and throughout the
world. Further, studies of the mode of action of anthrax
toxin have shown new cellular mechanisms that can be ex-
ploited for new therapies against cancer. Biodefense re-
search has built an infrastructure and trained a workforce
whose functions and abilities are being broadly applied to
all communicable diseases. Its efforts will lead to break-
throughs for many diseases in addition to making us safer
against a multitude of threats.
The reality is that there are no human endeavors with
zero risk, and scientific research carries some small chance
that an individual will accidentally be exposed to a patho-
gen or that a resolute person will employ research to inflict
harm; a determined perpetrator is difficult to stop. How-
ever, the risk is greater from outside a laboratory and from
technologies other than bioscience. And the damage to the
future of America will be infinitely greater if one incident,
no matter its extent, devastates our scientific endeavors be-
cause of precipitous regulatory responses so onerous as to
cripple research in this country to our detriment and to the
advantage of other countries.
This is not to contend that there should be no oversight
or that the scientific community does not have a duty to
communicate about its research with the public. To the
contrary, in response to a report of the National Academies,
Congress conceived the National Science Advisory Board
for Biosecurity (NSABB). Last year, the NSABB produced
a report titled Proposed Framework for the Oversight of Dual
Use Life Sciences Research: Strategies for Minimizing the Po-
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tential Misuse of Research Information. This report was
transmitted to 14 federal agencies and the White House
and released to the public. It since has been the topic of fed-
erally sponsored discussions and meetings designed to gar-
ner the input of the scientific community and the public to-
ward the development of calibrated federal guidelines and
regulations for the oversight of life-sciences research that
may have the potential for malevolent use depending on
the degree of risk and the probability of occurrence (see
http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/).
The American public knows that a robust and sophisti-
cated bioscientific enterprise is critical to keeping us healthy
and strong in every respect. The wealth of our nation de-
pends on economic productivity, which, in turn, relies heav-
ily on scientific progress and innovation. But our nation’s
strength has been in its willingness to accept risk as a neces-
sary component of scientific development in diverse areas
from vaccines and other therapeutic measures to space explo-
ration. It is imperative that our political leadership remem-
bers this also and acts in a commensurate manner.
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